














































Abstract: The transition from an oil-based to a knowledge-based economy requires that the 
Saudi population dramatically increases its level of human capital. This paper argues that non-
cognitive skills may be a bottleneck in the formation of human capital and proposes a policy to 
indirectly strengthen those skills. The core of the proposal is a government-financed gift to each 
Saudi citizen reaching adult age, the SSGY. 
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The single most relevant feature of the Saudi economy is its heavy reliance on an ex-
haustible resource, oil. That feature implies that the long-term prosperity of Saudi society cru-
cially depends on its ability to save and prepare for a time when oil will have become economi-
cally irrelevant. Over the next decades, a transition from an oil-based economy to a diversified 
knowledge-based economy should be accomplished. Along the way, natural wealth has to be 
transformed into man-made wealth, i.e. physical capital and human capital embodied in the 
Saudi population. Saudi Arabia still has huge oil reserves and the time horizon for a Saudi non-
oil economy is a relatively distant future. Yet, it should start the preparation early since the 
overall required adjustment is large. Today, the oil sector directly contributes about 40 percent 
of Saudi GDP and 90 percent of Saudi exports. Oil revenue represents some 80 percent of gov-
ernment revenue. Progressively eliminating dependence on an exhaustible resource that is likely 
to be depleted in the course of the next two or three generations is the main economic challenge 
facing Saudi Arabia. 
During the last four decades, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has made an immense pro-
gress, not only in economic terms but also in terms of the education and health standards en-
joyed by its citizens. One can appreciate that progress by looking at the growth of per-capita 
GDP, university enrollment rates, and life expectancy as well as by looking at the decline of 
infant mortality rates.1 One may see those achievements reflected in the majestic towers of Ri-
yadh and in the creation of entirely new economic cities. Yet, even splendor carries a risk, as too 
much of it can make you blind. This paper argues that there is a fundamental factor of economic 
development that has so far been neglected in the development strategy followed by the Saudi 
government. That factor refers to those non-cognitive skills of people that motivate and guide 
agents’ decision-making in advanced market economies. 
“The most valuable of all capital is that invested in human beings; and of that capital the 
most precious part is the result of the care and influence of the mother”. 120 years after Alfred 
Marshall wrote that sentence, human capital has become the centerpiece of knowledge-based 
economies. In high-income countries, human capital accounts for about 80 percent of total 
wealth and is the main engine of economic growth. Such a large amount of human capital takes 
                                                     
1 Recent accounts of the progress made by the economy of Saudi Arabia as well as of some of its problems are 
offered e.g. by Brach (2009) and Rivlin (2009). On the political economy of rent extraction and distribution, see 
e.g. Beblaw and Luciani (1987); related formal models are offered by Shahnawaz and Nugent (2004), van der 
Ploeg (2010) and Wirl (2009). 
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a lot of time to be accumulated. Human capital does not simply spring out of newly built schools 
and universities. It is the result of a society-wide long-term process in which not only the formal 
education system but also families and workplaces play a major role. Along with cognitive abil-
ity, intrinsic motivation for learning and working, initiative, thrift, and perseverance determine 
how fast human capital accumulates in society. In high-income countries, attitudes and values 
that facilitate human capital formation are largely cultivated and transmitted by families. As I 
argue below, there is a serious risk for Saudi Arabia that generous public investment in formal 
education may fail to deliver the expected amount of human capital because the needed com-
plementary attitudes and values are too weak. 
The aim of this paper is to propose a reform project that circumvents that risk. The next 
Section presents results from scholastic achievement tests that help to justify the concern about a 
lasting deficit of human capital in the Saudi population. The core of the paper is Section 3 where 
the reform project is formulated and motivated. At the center of the project there is a social grant 
that all Saudis entering adulthood should receive from the government. The issue of how to fi-
nance that grant is attacked in Section 4. Section 5 briefly concludes. 
 
2 Scholastic achievement as an indicator of future human capital 
 
Society invests in the human capital of the next generation at schools, in firms and in 
families. The returns from such investments materialize through increased labor productivity 
and take the form of increased wages, salaries and entrepreneurial incomes for the next genera-
tion. What are the expected returns of current Saudi investment in human capital? 
Predicting the yields of current human capital formation in absolute terms would require 
making several heroic assumptions. A less demanding exercise is to assess the returns of Saudi 
investments relative to those of other countries. It may be performed by simply comparing inter-
national standardized tests of scholastic achievement. As shown by empirical studies, scholastic 
achievement tests are a powerful predictor of wages and lifetime income.2 By comparing the 
achievement of Saudi pupils with the achievement of pupils in other countries one may try to 
guess the relative productivity of those individuals when they will have reached working age 
and be participating in the labor market.3 
                                                     
2 See e.g. Heckman et al. (2006). 
3 There is also evidence that scholastic achievement of individuals translate into macroeconomic growth. For in-




Saudi Arabia participated in the fourth assessment of the Trends in International Mathe-
matics and Science Study (TIMMS) conducted by the International Association for the Evalua-
tion of Educational Achievement. In 2007, standardized tests were administered to a sample of 
8th-grade students in the Kingdom and a host of other countries to assess proficiency in mathe-
matics and science. In mathematics, Saudi Arabia reached rank 48 among 48 countries. The 
performance gap was substantial in comparison with many countries; for instance, while only 18 
percent of Saudi students managed to achieve at least the lowest benchmark for the mathematics 
test, in Egypt 47 percent of the tested pupils reached that benchmark and in Malaysia 82 percent 
did. In particular, the Kingdom ranked lower than a number of countries that spend significantly 
less on education per-pupil than Saudi Arabia, like Jordan, Syria, and Tunisia. The science test 
was slightly better for the Kingdom, as Saudi Arabia ranked 43 out of 48. Still, the gap as com-
pared to countries like Jordan, Malaysia and Egypt was substantial. 
Results about the attainment of the intermediate benchmarks in mathematics and science 
mirrored those about the lowest benchmarks. The following table reports how the Kingdom 















                                                     
dustries in Great Britain at the time of its industrial revolution; Becker et al. (2010) show that education was 













Percentage of  Students Reaching the 
Science Intermediate Benchmark 
1 Malaysia (50) Jordan (56) 
2 Jordan (35) Malaysia (50) 
3 Egypt (21) Bahrain (49) 
4 Tunisia (21) Syria (39) 
5 Bahrain (19) Oman (32) 
6 Syria (17) Tunisia (31) 
7 Oman (14) Kuwait (28) 
8 Kuwait (6) Egypt (27) 
9 Qatar (4) Saudi Arabia (18) 
10 Saudi Arabia (3) Qatar (11) 
 
 
As mentioned above, empirical studies that track the same individuals from childhood to 
adulthood find a close correlation between scholastic achievement and earnings. So, suppose 
that the whole oil had disappeared from Saudi Arabia and that human capital were the only 
source of income. Assume that average human capital in a country is proportional to the educa-
tional achievement of the 8th-grade students of that international test. In that purely hypothetical 
non-oil situation, Saudis’ income would be much lower than Egyptian average income. To ap-
preciate what this means, recall that Egyptian per-capita GDP is currently worth only one fourth 
of per-capita GDP in Saudi Arabia. 
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While it is possible that a relatively low level of skills during secondary school be com-
pensated by fast skill upgrading during tertiary education, this is not what studies of human de-
velopment suggest.4 University enrollment is high in Saudi Arabia in comparison to most Arab 
countries. However, it displays a strong bias against science and technology, both of which are 
crucial for increasing future labor productivity. Thus, in 2004 only 9 percent of Saudi graduates 
qualified in science or technology, as compared to 19 percent in Bahrain, 29 percent in Iraq, 25 
percent in Jordan, 22 percent in Lebanon, and 19 percent in Morocco.5 
High levels of scholastic achievement tests signal high future productivity of the next 
generation because they are the result of skills that individuals later use in working activities. 
Psychologists and economists distinguish between two types of skills: cognitive and non-
cognitive skills. Cognitive skills are close to what is called “intelligence” in common parlance: 
problem-solving ability, knowledge and wisdom. Non-cognitive skills refer to “character” and 
include motivation, initiative, perseverance, conscientiousness, and a forward-looking attitude. 
Cognitive and non-cognitive skills develop at different pace at various stages of childhood and 
youth and interact with each other. Both are fundamental determinants of outcomes in terms of 
scholastic achievement and professional success. Intelligence without character produces bohe-
mians at best, public dangers at worst; character without intelligence cannot produce the creative 
individuals needed for economic and social progress. Cognitive as well as non-cognitive skills 
are therefore necessary for human development and economics growth. 
For Saudi Arabia, this means that a successful transition from the oil-based economy to 
the knowledge-based economy requires an enhanced effort to form both cognitive and non-
cognitive skills. Investing in formal education is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a 
speedy improvement of individual capabilities. In countries with a high level of human capital, 
the education system is one leg of the transmission of cognitive and, to a lesser extent, non-
cognitive skills. The other leg is the family. Within families, parents often try to transmit some 
of their professional knowledge and wisdom to their children. More importantly, parents play a 
fundamental role in shaping the character of their children, whether the parents realize it or not. 
Their example can namely transmit a sense of purpose, a thirst of knowledge, a work ethic, dis-
cipline, and a sense of responsibility. Such non-cognitive skills are crucial for translating the 
abstract notions presented by teachers at school into concrete knowledge of the individual, ready 
to be activated when the individual is performing an economic activity. 
                                                     
4 See e.g. Cunha and Heckman (2009). 
5 Those numbers are reported by Rivlin (2009, p. 224). 
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Families do not always instill values and attitudes that promote human capital forma-
tion.6 Parents are poor providers of non-cognitive skills that are conducive to pro-learning and 
pro-work attitudes if they do not possess them in the first place and exhibit them in their every-
day life. This is a common finding in studies of disadvantaged adolescents in OECD countries, 
one that has important implications for their social policy. One may conjecture that a similar 
link between the work experience of parents and their children’s skill formation exists in the 
case of the ordinary population of countries that derive the bulk of their income from natural 
resources rather than from the activation of their human capital. 
Consider the current role of work for Saudi adults. According to recent statistics, the 
Saudi population aged 20-64 amounted to 8,523,000 individuals in 2007. This is the order of 
magnitude of the potential Saudi workforce. Official statistics report that some 3,585,000 Saudis 
were employed which suggests that more than half of the potential Saudi labor force was not 
utilized. Because of various statistical problems, such an assessment is likely to grossly over-
state the actual contribution of Saudi labor to domestic production. According to a recent study, 
the Saudi employment rate in 2007 was merely 24.5 percent and it was concentrated in the pub-
lic sector.7 By comparison, employment rates in OECD countries are close to 70 percent and 
only one employed person out of ten works for the government. The comparison is even more 
extreme if one looks at female employment. While in OECD countries employment rates for 
women are only a few percentage points below the employment rates for men, in the case of the 
Saudi population the female employment rate is only a sixth of the male employment rate. 
From a long-run perspective, say the one of current Saudi grandchildren, this state of af-
fairs does not justify economic optimism. In order to achieve the transition from an oil-based to 
a knowledge-based economy it is not enough to endow your grandchildren with new universi-
ties, increase their enrollment rate, and facilitate their integration in the labor market by means 
of a Saudization policy. You also have to instill a sense of responsibility and purpose, a work 
ethos and a learning ethos in the young generations. This process may not spontaneously arise 
because the share of the population in working age that is engaged in production activities that 
make use of advanced knowledge and generate a large amount of value added is low, especially 
in the case of women. 
 
 
                                                     
6 Corneo and Jeanne (2010) offer an endogenous growth model where parents transmit values to their children and 




3 Elements of reform 
 
In order to break the dependence on oil and become a knowledge-based economy, Saudi 
Arabia should accompany investments in formal education by a strengthening of those attitudes 
and values that are conducive to human capital formation. Recent research on how value sys-
tems evolve strongly suggests that changes in the economic opportunities faced by people are a 
powerful engine of value change.8 That is, far from being immutable ethnic traits, values and 
attitudes do respond to material incentives – although the reaction time may span one generation 
or more. Based on that insight, I consider an economic policy that opens an entirely new frame-
work of life opportunities and by doing this promotes the kind of values and attitudes needed to 
build the new knowledge-based economy. 
In what follows I propose that a program of wealth transfer to the Saudi youth be 
launched under the auspices of the King of Saudi Arabia and run by its government. I refer to 
that program as to the Saudi Start-up Gift to the Youth (SSGY). Under that program, every 
Saudi citizen reaching adulthood would inherit an equal amount of wealth from society. A gift 
of 100,000 Saudi riyals is proposed as a reference for further discussion.9 
Eligible persons for the start-up gift would be all Saudi citizens, both males and females, 
with main residence in the country and who have not committed serious crimes. In a given year, 
all citizens who become adult – say eighteen or twenty-one years old – would receive at their 
birthday – upon request and verification of eligibility - a large money transfer from a dedicated 
SSGY-fund. Each individual would be responsible for the use of his or her gift and free to make 
the best use out of it as seen by the individual, without any restrictions for women. The amount 
of the gift would be the same for everybody, independently of an individual’s personal charac-
teristics and family background, including income and wealth. The level of the gift may be ad-
justed over time only by the King, in order to take the effects of inflation, economic growth, and 
positive as well as negative shocks into account. 
                                                     
7 Hertog (2009). 
8 Early models of purposively chosen values were offered by Akerlof (1983); recent work on endogenous values 
includes Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Bisin and Verdier (2000) and Corneo and Jeanne (2009). An overview on 
value change in many countries is offered by Inglehart and Baker (2000). 
9 About ten years ago, Ackermann and Alstott (1999) made a similar proposal for the United States. They proposed 
that at age 21 each citizen should receive a stake of 80,000 USD from the government. While their proposal 
was not adopted in the US, a similar but smaller-scale program was launched in the United Kingdom in 2005, 
the UK Child Trust Fund. 
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As explained shortly, the SSGY-program should be accompanied by some other policies 
so as to bring about progress on a number of fronts, the main one being the accumulation of 
human capital so as to facilitate the transition to a knowledge-based economy. I will detail those 
accompanying policies while discussing the main beneficial effects that one may expect from 
such an overall reform. The expected benefits include the following ones: 
 
1. The program will strengthen the sense of responsibility of the youth and en-
courage the young members of society to think deeper about their life goals 
and to actively pursue those goals. The anticipation of the gift would prompt 
the families of prospective receivers and the schools to prepare the receivers 
for decision-making. In families and schools people will ponder on the appro-
priate goals in their life and how the gift could best be used to attain those 
goals. As experience accumulates, prospective receivers and their reference 
adult persons will increasingly discuss about ways in which people they know 
used their gift and learn from others’ experience; some may have used the gift 
to cover the set-up costs of a small business, while others may have paid for a 
university specialization, or invested the money in a mutual fund. Some indi-
viduals may have squandered their money. In this novel environment for Saudi 
society, young people will feel more empowered and responsible for their own 
fate. Thus, they will focus more attention on self-realization and life planning. 
However, it will not be a purely individual undertaking but a societal one, since 
everybody receives the same gift. Being incorporated in a collective discourse, 
an individual’s search for goals and instruments will take the broader concerns 
of the community into account. 
  
2. The SSGY will eliminate artificial barriers to entrepreneurship and profes-
sional specialization set by both mental habits and borrowing constraints. Re-
garding mental habits, the SSGY will transport the possibilities of becoming an 
entrepreneur and pursuing a technical or scientific career into the mental hori-
zon of the whole Saudi youth. Usually, mental habits associated with distinc-
tive family backgrounds severely limit the choice set that is effectively per-
ceived by young individuals thinking about their future occupation: doing 
something very different from what their parents or close relatives do may 
simply be “unthinkable”. This is a reason why the mere supply of education 
and training by the government is ineffective when parents do not transmit to 
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their children an intrinsic motivation for entrepreneurship and learning. As a 
result, plenty of talents may remain unexploited. For instance, children of pub-
lic employees that have entrepreneurial talent may never dare to become entre-
preneurs; beduins’ children that are highly proficient in natural sciences at 
school may not seriously take the possibility of a scientific career into account. 
The changes in perspective and novel thoughts brought about by the SSGY-
program will make a breach into those mental habits and enlarge the effective 
horizon of occupational choice. Regarding borrowing constraints, the SSGY 
will remove those obstacles to the creation of small enterprises and to invest-
ment in human capital that derive from an individual’s or his family’s insuffi-
cient non-human wealth. By eliminating artificial barriers to occupational 
choice, the SSGY program will improve the allocation of talents to business, 
technical, and scientific activities and thus contribute to the endogenous devel-
opment of those human resources that constitute the key factor for the long-
term prosperity of the Kingdom.  
 
3. The existence of the SSGY-program will justify significant cuts to distortive 
public expenditures and a roll-back of stifling bureaucracy. Since all Saudis 
will have the opportunity to start a business or to acquire a specialization or 
professional qualification, there will be less pressure on the government to em-
ploy people just to provide them with a job. By the same token, subsidies and 
public lending to promote the establishment of small businesses could be sub-
stantially reduced if a SSGY-program were in place. Substantial fiscal savings 
could also be achieved by cutting subsidies to social housing and rolling back 
allocations to the Real Estate Development Fund. In this way, bureaucracy may 
be drastically reduced along with the waste that it causes by prompting rent-
seeking behavior by citizens. Eliminating ill-targeted subsidies would also 
eliminate the distortions in individual choices caused by the preferential treat-
ment of some forms of consumption or investment over others. 
 
4. The existence of the SSGY will allow for an extended role of the market in 
higher education. This is likely to be a crucial step in order to build the new 
knowledge-based economy. Making higher education respond to supply and 
demand forces will bring about a reasonably efficient allocation of human and 
material resources instead of the current serious mismatch between the needs 
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of the domestic economy and the qualifications of university graduates. Uni-
versity autonomy and competition should increase, with universities charging 
tuition fees for what they offer and students effectively demanding quality for 
what they pay. The SSGY makes student grants and loans – along with their 
administrative costs - redundant and eliminates the main reason to forbid uni-
versities to charge tuition fees. As a consequence, subsidies for institutions of 
higher education could be substantially reduced. Access to student dormitories 
may also be allocated through the market, thus eliminating another source of 
deadweight losses. A market for higher education with autonomous universi-
ties competing with each other will develop, with no harm for the relatively 
poor regions of the Kingdom. In relative terms, the poor regions will actually 
be those profiting most from the program, so that the latter will also contribute 
to reduce significant interregional disparity in Saudi Arabia. 
 
5. The program will provide a remarkable support to young couples that wish to 
create a family by giving them an independent financial basis. The gift from 
the government could be used to buy a flat or a house, something which is 
strongly needed but that some 45 to 60 percent of Saudis currently cannot af-
ford. In this way, a basic security level would be obtained by citizens at a cru-
cial stage of their lifecycle. In turn, the SSGY would substantially diminish the 
burden carried by middle-class and relatively poor people with many children 
in marriage age. 
 
6. The SSGY-program will offer young women a material and spiritual basis for 
achieving economic independency. Putting the creativity of women to the ser-
vice of the Kingdom is not only an obvious way to raise current non-oil GDP. 
In view of the special role of mothers already stressed by Alfred Marshall, it is 
also a crucial ingredient for increasing the future level of human capital. Fe-
male participation in the economy will endow mothers with those skills that 
once transmitted to their children will facilitate their children’s accumulation 
of human capital. In the context of the Saudi labor market, it may be crucial to 
produce a critical mass effect. This means that many more women may prepare 
to actively participate in the economy if they expected many others to do the 
same. This may occur because gradually mixing the gender composition of 
workplaces is not a feasible option and/or because social acceptance of 
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women’s work would be greater if many more women worked. This means that 
there are multiple equilibria and that an equilibrium different from the current 
one is possible, one where both society’s demand for female work and 
women’s willingness to enter the labor market are much larger than they cur-
rently are. The SSGY-program would contribute to coordinate expectations on 
the good equilibrium and allow female participation to cross the critical thresh-
old, so that a rapid endogenous growth may set in. 
 
7. The gift for the youth will boost both demand and supply of bank and insur-
ance products tailored to the needs of young savers. Some portion of the total 
gift amount will be saved either to finance consumption at later age or to take 
advantage of future investment opportunities. Those entitled to the gift will 
have an incentive to improve their degree of financial literacy, something 
which would be supported by schools. There will be growth opportunities for 
the banking and insurance sector, in some areas of which Saudi firms have a 
comparative advantage, notably in Islamic banking. 
 
8. The SSGY-program will improve social justice by distributing opportunities 
for self-realization more equally in the Kingdom. Whereas obtaining a job in 
the public sector is partly a matter of luck and personal connections, the SSGY 
is a transparent and equal support for everyone. The under-privileged young 
Saudis will be those benefitting most from the SSGY-program in terms of ex-
pected utility. It will be a substantial help not only for those who are materially 
poor. Through its effect on attitudes, it will also help those who are spiritually 
poor, i.e. those who are passive, who lack a sense of purpose and a moral an-
chor and those who are easy prey of false prophets. Since the program is tar-
geted at Saudis and many expatriates live in the Kingdom, it is important that 
measures be taken to ensure their fair treatment. Two fields where reforms are 
in order concern the procedures to acquire Saudi nationality and the restrictions 
on the internal mobility and self-employment of expatriates. 
 
9. The SSGY-program will promote solidarity and acts of loyal citizenship. Hu-
mankind is endowed with an inner tendency to reciprocate. Those young peo-
ple who will receive an explicit gift from the Kingdom that endows them with 
considerably greater life-shaping opportunities will be in a moral disposition to 
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reciprocate. This will generate a long-lasting increase in social cohesion and 
political stability in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, as people receive the SSGY, it 
will become politically easier to raise taxes which in turn make people feel the 
costs of government spending and thereby increase fiscal discipline. 
 
10. The SSGY-program will increase the international prestige of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia as a worldwide pioneer in launching a policy that contributes to 
human development, social justice, and economic efficiency. While the SSGY-
program is a policy that is tailored to the Saudi economy, it may prove an in-
spiring model for other emerging countries with substantial public financial 
wealth looking for an alternative to traditional sovereign wealth funds. 
 
4 Financial feasibility 
 
The financial feasibility of the SSGY-program relies upon the financial reserves accumu-
lated by the Saudi government. Technical implementation would have a part of the govern-
ment’s deposits with the banking sector allocated to a dedicated SSGY-fund. Similarly to a sov-
ereign wealth fund, the SSGY-fund would invest its endowment in the capital market; the ensu-
ing returns would be used to finance the SSGY-program. 
In order to give an idea of the order of magnitude of the SSGY-program in relation to 
Saudi public finances, suppose that every year 500,000 young Saudis receive from the govern-
ment 100,000 SR. The total expenditure would then amount to 50 billion SR, roughly corre-
sponding to a 10 percent increase of public expenditure. However, the net costs to the fisc would 
be significantly lower because of the concomitant cuts in subsidies and public employment men-
tioned at points 3 and 4 in the previous Section. There will also be positive indirect effects for 
the budget due to a stronger economy and therefore larger tax revenues, including the Zakat 
duty. 
Another way to look at the financial burden caused by the SSGY-program is to focus on 
the associated SSGY-fund. Suppose that the fund should yearly distribute 50 billion SR in real 
terms in perpetuity. Assuming an average real yearly rate of return on investment of 5 percent, a 
permanent revenue in that order of magnitude could be generated by a fund worth one trillion 
SR. According to recent statistics, this is considerably less than the current government deposits 




When introducing the SSGY, transitional measures would be warranted. First, lack of 
experience at the beginning of the program may severely undermine people’s ability to make 
good use of the gift. Hence, the government should support decision-makers by information 
campaigns and advice at the local level. This could be achieved in cooperation with the schools 
and a number of organizations like the chambers of commerce and industry, institutions provid-
ing vocational training, and universities. 
Second, a transitional gift scheme is required for fairness reasons. It would be utterly un-
fair if, say the cohort of those born in 1991 would receive 100,000 SR and those born in 1990 
would receive zero. Various ways to solve this problem exist. One may think of a gradual in-
crease of the gift, starting from a low level. Alternatively, one may think of beginning with gifts 
given also to cohorts older than, say, twenty, with an amount decreasing with age and a gradual 




The transition from an oil-based economy to a dynamic knowledge-base economy is that 
kind of challenge where there are no forerunners providing one with an illuminating example to 
follow. Countries facing that challenge have to wisely choose within a large set of policies. 
Some policies, like substantial public investment in education and health, support to research 
and development and industrial diversification, are likely to be appropriate for all transition 
countries and relatively easy to choose. Other policies may be appropriate only for a subset of 
countries and require governments to take not yet travelled roads. The Saudi Start-up Gift to the 
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